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This paper presents the ﬁrst analysis on how ﬁnancial savings arising from energy efﬁcient
ships are allocated between owners and those hiring the ships. This as an important under-
taking as allocation of ﬁnancial savings is expected to have an impact on the incentives
faced by ship owners to invest in more energy efﬁcient vessels. We focus on the dry bulk
Panamax segment as it contributes to around 50 Mt (5%) of total CO2 emissions from ship-
ping in 2007 and therefore its importance in terms of environmental impact should not be
neglected. The time charter market represents a classical example of the principal–agent
problem similar to the tenant–landlord problem in the buildings sector. We discovered
that on average only 40% of the ﬁnancial savings delivered by energy efﬁciency accrue to
ship owner for the period 2008–2012. The ﬁnding that only part of the savings are
recouped by shipowners affecting their incentives towards energy efﬁciency could conse-
quently have implications on the type of emission reduction policies opted at both, global
and regional levels.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
As the energy efﬁciency of a ship, i.e. the amount of fuel consumed per unit of transport supplied, is a function of both the
technical speciﬁcation and the way in which a ship is maintained and operated, one can distinguish between ‘‘technical efﬁ-
ciency’’ which refers to some baseline conditions, and ‘‘operational efﬁciency’’ which takes into account the practicalities of
the voyage, variability in environmental conditions and commercial realities of operations. One example of the former is the
Energy Efﬁciency Design Index (EEDI) (Buhaug et al., 2009) while a measure of operational efﬁciency can be obtained by tak-
ing measurements of fuel consumption and work over a period of time (IMO, 2005).
Energy efﬁciency is expected to be an important feature for a ﬁrm operating a ship, as it inﬂuences its overall costs and
revenues. There are a number of different markets in shipping where energy efﬁciency might be reﬂected in prices: the new
build market, the second hand market and the charter markets, both voyage and time charter. In the voyage market, char-
terers hire ships on a given route and pay a ﬁxed amount, which includes fuel consumption, while in the time charter market
the daily price for hiring a ship excludes the fuel costs which are additionally borne by charterers. This article focuses on the
time charter market as it represents a classical example of the principal–agent problem, also known as split incentive and
tenant–landlord problem (Blumstein et al., 1980; Brown, 2001 and Graus and Worrel, 2008; Vernon and Meier, 2012 in
the transport sector), although the veriﬁcation of the agency problem on the level of investments is not tackled as the data
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decide the level of technological energy efﬁciency, while charterers (principals) bear the costs associated with agent’s chosen
level of energy efﬁciency, i.e. the fuel bill in the case of the shipping market. This paper quantiﬁes the extent to which the
fuel savings related to energy efﬁciency ships are captured by ship owners through higher charter rates using a linear regres-
sion of about 2000 ﬁxtures in the Panamax dry bulk market observed between 2007 and 2012. This is an important endeav-
our, as this issue directly impacts the revenues of ship owners and therefore their incentive to invest in energy efﬁciency.
Panamax refers to ships with deadweight (payload capacity) of approximately 60,000–80,000 tonnes which are designed
to have maximum capacity whilst being able to transit via the Panama Canal, although according to the taxonomy of the
database used in this study Panamax ships range between 60,000 and 100,000 tonnes. We selected the Panamax dry bulk
sector to carry out our analysis because of its reputation for being competitive (Stopford, 2009). This sector was attributed
a total of about 50 MtCO2 in 2007, i.e. about 5% of total sea transport emissions, a considerable quantity which is expected to
increase due to higher demand for shipping services (IMO, 2009).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses econometric analyses of the time charter market, rewards of energy
efﬁcient investments in the shipping sector and the way energy efﬁciency can be deﬁned. Section 3 describes the data we use
in this article while Section 4 discusses the estimation and the result presented in this study. Section 5 draws the conclusions
and the policy implications of our work before presenting recommendations for further work which could help take the
analysis in this paper forward.2. Literature review: econometric studies and the impact of energy efﬁciency on charter rates
Econometric studies modelling time charter and voyage rates can be grouped into two categories, i.e. those addressing the
relationship among different rates, and those exploring the drivers inﬂuencing time charter and voyage rates. The existence
of a relationship between time charter rates of different durations or between time charter and voyage rates is explained by
the fact that a charterer has the option of entering into a single time charter contract for the whole period he needs a ship for,
any mixture of time charter and spot contracts, or a number of voyage rates covering the routes they need to journey.
Veenstra and Franses (1997) found the existence of a stable long-term relationship between the prices of six routes, three
being served by capesize, the other by Panamax ships, all driven by one common trend. Berg-Andreassen (1997) reports that
the conventional explanation of the time charter rates setting process is essentially correct: spot rate changes matter but
spot rate levels do not. With regard to the studies discussing the drivers inﬂuencing time charter and voyage rates, fuel price
has received considerable attention, which can partly be attributed to the debate on the use of market-based instruments to
address CO2 emissions in the shipping sector (Vivid Economics, 2010) and to the fuel costs estimated to be about 60% of
ships’ costs in the current climate of high fuel prices and low charter rates (Lloyd’s List, 2012a). As voyage rates comprise
costs related to fuel consumption, the relationship between these rates and fuel prices give an idea of the extent to which
changes in fuel price are either absorbed by ship owners or passed to charterers. According to UNCTAD (2010), owners of
ships used in the iron ore trade passed changes in the fuel price entirely to charterers while only a third of the changes
was passed in the wet bulk market, both ﬁndings being conﬁrmed by Vivid Economics (2010). In the case of grains, Vivid
Economics (2010) reports that only 20% of the changes in fuel costs are passed on, about half the value estimated by
Lundgren (1996) on the USA-Europe route. Findings discussed for the coal market in Chowdhury and Dinwoodie (2011)
depend on the type of coal, the size of ships, i.e. Panamax or capesize, and the route. The average of all estimated models
is very close to full transfer of fuel costs, considerably higher than the 40% estimated by Lundgren (1996) on the USA-Europe
route.
On the basis that most of the variables affecting voyage rates are likely to affect time charter rates, it is interesting to dis-
cuss the models estimated for voyage rates. The model in Chowdhury and Dinwoodie (2011) and Vivid Economics (2010), for
example, include bunker prices, trade volume and ﬂeet size. An increase in trade is expected to cause an increase in the voy-
age rates through an increase in the demand for ships while an increase in the ﬂeet is expected to cause a decrease in the
rates. The model in Lundgren (1996) includes lay-up and change in trade, as supply and demand factor, respectively. The
speciﬁcation used in UNCTAD (2010) and Tsolakis (2005) introduces the commodity price among the variables used to
explain voyage rates. The coefﬁcient is found to be negative and statistically signiﬁcant in UNCTAD (2010) but positive in
Tsolakis (2005) for both the Panamax and capesize bulk carrier.
As the effect of energy efﬁciency on time charters has not been explored by the academic literature, our literature review
utilises anecdotal evidence derived from news articles and industry reports. Kollamthodi et al. (2008), based on an interview
with the Norwegian Shipowners Association, claim that charterers are willing to pay higher rates for fuel efﬁcient ships. In
the container sector, a recent poll of twenty brokers showed that fuel efﬁciency was the single most important factor for the
hiring of vessels on time charters, and that more efﬁcient vessels obtain rate premiums compared to standard vessels
(Sustainable Shipping, 2012). Maersk Line, one of the leading container companies, recently stated their willingness to
pay for the retroﬁt of the vessels they charter in, as this results in a lower fuel bill for the company (Lloyd’s List, 2012b). This
suggests that charters are willing to trade lower fuel bills for increased costs in the chartering of ships. In fact, analysts have
argued for some time that a two-tier market is emerging, with charterers willing to pay more for efﬁcient vessels and older
and less fuel-efﬁcient vessels losing out to modern tonnage (Sustainable Shipping, 2012 and Lloyd’s List, 2012c). In the tan-
ker sector, oil companies are reported to prefer newer vessels even if they are slightly more expensive (Lloyd’s List, 2012d).
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mation on costs and savings from an energy saving measure as well as uncertainty as to whether the market will pay a pre-
mium for fuel efﬁcient ships will result in sub optimal levels of investment. Based on a survey of ﬁve operators and seven
other maritime stakeholders, Faber et al. (2011) conclude shipowners investing in fuel efﬁciency cannot recoup their invest-
ments, unless they either operate their own ships or have long term agreements with charterers. Wang et al. (2010) point out
that charterers may be unlikely to pay a premium to reﬂect energy efﬁciency due to the diversity of the charter markets,
where each sector comprises several subsectors reﬂecting cargo capacity, dimensions and other vessel characteristics, and
to the difﬁculty in verifying fuel consumption claim made by the owners, a key factor in the split incentive problem dis-
cussed above. Interviews conducted by one author of this paper pointed to similar conclusions. Three ship owners/operators
and a management company showed scepticism to the notion that charter rates reﬂect a premium for energy efﬁciency and
notion that investments in energy efﬁciency sustained by the ship owners could be recouped (Rehmatulla, 2014).
An argument for investment in energy efﬁciency is that it increases the success rate of winning contracts and therefore
provides better utilisation rates of the ships, which may be an important factor particularly in an oversupplied market like
the current one (Wang et al., 2010; Rehmatulla, 2014). According to a large bulk shipping owner, the company would still
invest in energy efﬁciency even if not remunerated through charter rates as many major charterers require ships to comply
with a certain level of environmental performance (Rehmatulla, 2014). This view has been recently conﬁrmed by Lloyd’s List
(2012b), according to which, Maersk and other operators in the container market, as well as operators of other vessel types
that hire ships on long charters may not be willing to pay premiums for energy efﬁcient vessels but they feel compelled to
take in the better ships ﬁrst, where owners of vessels with a lower performance are forced to start accepting lower rates or
shorter contracts. It is interesting to note that less energy efﬁcient ships are forced to accept lower rates, as discussed in
Lloyd’s List (2012b), contradicts the statement that energy efﬁcient is not remunerated through charter rates.3. Descriptive analysis of the data
Data on the ﬁxtures between January 2007 and September 2012 were taken from the Clarksons Ship Intelligence Network
(SIN). The SIN database contains information on date of the ﬁxtures, name of the ship being chartered, build year, dead-
weight tonnage, start and end of laycan period, daily charter rates and length of the charters. Ships involved in the ﬁxtures
were matched, based on their IMO number, to the information from the Clarksons World Fleet Register (WFR) database
which contains information on gross tonnage of a ship, installed power, fuel consumption, bunker capacity, the build year
and speed. It is worth stressing that all technical data in this dataset describes the design characteristics of ships rather than
their operational performance. From the variables above we computed a simpliﬁed EEDI as described below. Next, we used
the following variables from SIN to describe the state of the economy and the shipping industry: quantity of commodities
carried by Panamax, fuel prices (HFO380 in Rotterdam), the size of the Panamax ﬂeet, and an index describing the rate
prevailing in the market for one annual time charters. The quantity of traded commodity carried by Panamax has been com-
puted by multiplying the total seaborne iron, grain and coal by the share carried by Panamax ships out of the quantity carried
by all ship types. Information on the share of each commodity, taken from Stopford (2009), is based on data from 2001 to
2002 and is assumed to stay constant across the period covered by our dataset, as we did not have access to data from more
recent years. Finally, we computed the price of the mix of commodities carried by Panamax from the World Bank Pink Data.
The price of each commodity was weighted by using its share out of the total cargo transported by Panamax ship in 2010.
Data on the shares was sourced from UNCTAD (2011).
Calculating a ship’s technical energy efﬁciency requires measurement of both fuel consumption and performed transport
work. Whilst the EEDI regulation has made veriﬁed calculation of technical energy efﬁciency for new ships compulsory since
1st January 2013 (IMO, 2011), there is no deﬁnitive database for the existing ﬂeet, as ship owners and charterers have to
work with estimates of energy efﬁciency computed from the key ship parameters. In fact, estimates of the ﬂeet have been
used to form the baseline curves stipulated in the IMO MARPOL Annex VI amendment (IMO, 2011) while a similar approach
is taken in the formation of the Existing Vessel Design Index (EVDI) (Rightship, 2012). The formula applied in both instances
isEFF ¼ 0:75Pme:sfcme:Cf þ Pae:sfcae:Cf
V  dwt ð1Þwhere Pme and Pae are the installed power of the main and auxiliary engine, Cf the carbon factor of the fuel, sfcme and sfcae the
speciﬁc fuel consumption of the main and auxiliary engine, respectively, V the vessel’s speed and dwt the vessel’s dead-
weight. Databases, such as Clarksons World Fleet Register, list most of the input data for the calculation, but are often poorly
populated for the sfcme, Pme, Pae and sfcae. This paper adopts (1) to compute a simpliﬁed EEDI, as described in IMO (2011).
In time charter markets, the energy efﬁciency of ships is mainly communicated by ship owners through the fuel
consumption and speed information (both for ballast and laden legs) provided during the negotiation process and ultimately
reported in the contract. Actual performance can deviate from the values listed in the contract due to a number of factors
such as weather, deterioration of the hull (fouling), deterioration of the engine (wear), quality and caloriﬁc content of the
fuel. Due to the difﬁculty of verifying information about a ship’s fuel consumption prior to engaging it in a charter, the char-
terer is normally protected by a guarantee which stipulates the acceptable range for speed and fuel consumption (Veenstra
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efﬁciency was achieved.
As increased energy efﬁciency implies reduced energy consumption and therefore fuel bill for the charters, one would
expect this to be a desirable attribute for somebody looking to hire a ship thus ship owners may overstate claims related
to energy efﬁciency to attract business (Veenstra and Dalen, 2011). In order to limit unsubstantiated claims, claims can
be made against the guarantee. In addition, reputation in the industry to ensure repeat business, either for a speciﬁc ship
or for the company owning and operating the ship may constrain short-term beneﬁts from overplaying the energy efﬁciency
of a ship. Unfortunately, energy efﬁciency performance is difﬁcult to verify, even at the end of the charter, and claims against
the guarantee can be difﬁcult to pursue successfully (Williamson, 2012). Fuel performance measurements are normally
limited to collecting data about fuel consumed over a long period of time but very detailed information is required (e.g.
weather data) to assemble sufﬁcient evidence to effectively pursue claims against the guarantee Some reduction in the
uncertainty in energy efﬁciency and fuel consumption of a prospective charter can be obtained through the use of third party
data. The recently introduced mandatory calculation of the EEDI will increase the quality of the data available to charterers
for ships built after 2013, while some data is already publicly available for existing ships through tools such as the EVDI
(Rightship, 2012) and other broker-held sources.
After data cleansing, our dataset contains about 2000 observations. Filters to cleanse data were based on the character-
istics of the ships from the Panamax market, e.g. dwt not falling between 60,000 and 100,000 or showing different values for
any variables present in both datasets from where the data were sourced. The empirical distributions of the ship and ﬁxture
speciﬁc variables can be seen in Fig. 1. From the ﬁrst histogram in Fig. 1a, one can see that the dataset used in this study
comprises mainly relatively short ﬁxtures, as testiﬁed by the peak in the distribution for contracts ranging between 100
and 200 days. Because of the changing market conditions in the years covered by the sample, the rates of the ﬁxture do
not show a distribution similar to the one of the duration of the contracts. As can be seen in the ﬁgure, most of the rates
vary between 10,000 and 80,000 dollars per day but a signiﬁcant right tail well into the 100,000 $/day can be noticed. In
terms of the number of days between the signing of the contract the start of the laycan period, most contracts start relatively
soon after the signing date. Ships chartered out in the ﬁxtures in the dataset were built relatively recently when compared to
the 25 year average lifetime of a ship (Faber et al., 2011). A reduction in the number of ships built in the last three years or so
can be noticed in the ﬁgure. The distribution of the deadweight tonnage of the ships in the dataset reﬂects the market
segment analysed in this study, with most of the ships size falling between 70,000 dwt and 75,000 dwt. Finally, in the last
graph in Fig. 1a, bunker capacity shows quite a disperse distribution with values ranging between 1500 and 4500 tonnes,
with three peaks near the 2100, 2700 and 3200 values.Fig. 1a. Empirical distribution of ship-speciﬁc and ﬁxture-speciﬁc variables used in this study.
Fig. 1b. Empirical distribution of ship-speciﬁc and ﬁxture-speciﬁc variables used in this study.
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one can see that design speed takes mainly two values, 14 and 14.5. Finally, in the last two graphs in Fig. 1b, one can notice
the similarity in the distributions of the simpliﬁed EEDI and installed power. Considering a correlation of 0.86 between the
two variables in our dataset, one can conclude that information conveyed by the simpliﬁed EEDI index is of limited
additional value compared to the information conveyed by installed power in the case of the Panamax dry bulk market.
Fig. 2 shows the variables representing the condition of the economy and of the ship sector used in this study. Panamax
ﬂeet size has increased by about a third since January 2007, and so did the quantity of commodities carried by Panamax
ships, although this increased demand is not reﬂected in the average time charter which collapsed in the last quarter of
2008 before bouncing back slightly in 2010 and falling again in the remaining part of the sample. The bunker price has fully
recovered from the crash in the last quarter of 2008, with the price now close to the maximum in the sample. At a consump-
tion of 32 tonnes per day, recent bunker price implies a daily fuel bill of about 19,000 dollars, nearly twice the recent charter
rates on one-year contract. Finally, one can notice the similarities between the plots of the commodity carried by the
Panamax ships and the bunker price.4. Estimation procedure and results
Estimation of the effect of energy efﬁciency on the time charter rates is carried out using the cross-section dimension of
the dataset described above. We adopt the established General-To-Speciﬁc methodology (Campos et al., 2005) which starts
from a very general model likely to include irrelevant variables and narrows it down based on the statistical signiﬁcance of
Fig. 2. Time plots of the variables representing the condition of the economy and the shipping industry used in this study.
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tables below); its gross tonnage (Gross Tonnage in the tables), installed power on the ship measured in horsepower (Horse-
power), consumption of fuel measured in tonnes per day (Fuel Consumption), quantity of fuel which can be loaded onto the
ship (Bunker Capacity), design speed of the ship (Speed); simpliﬁed EEDI, as described above (EEDI), the fuel price in Rotter-
dam (Fuel Price); ﬂeet size measured in total dwt (Fleet), price of the commodity carried by Panamax ships (Commodity
Price), traded quantity carried by Panamax ships (Trade), number of days where loading of the cargo is allowed without
Table 1
Estimated values, standard error in parentheses, and statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients. Key for statistically signiﬁcance of coefﬁcients: ⁄⁄=1%, ⁄=5%.
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 230,220⁄⁄
(23,901)
162,230⁄⁄
(3815.90)
190,657.44⁄⁄
(3388.76)
150,170⁄⁄
(4316.80)
Age 349.09⁄⁄
(78.28)
352.10⁄⁄
(52.63)
346.55⁄⁄
(54.58)
295.14⁄⁄
(83.68)
Gross Tonnage 0.84⁄⁄
(0.30)
Horsepower 2.27⁄
(1.01)
Bunker capacity 2.58⁄⁄
(0.61)
2.43⁄⁄
(0.60)
2.48⁄⁄
(0.64)
1.96⁄
(0.98)
Speed 2485.10⁄
(1076.80)
EEDI 6689.80⁄
(2888.20)
Fuel price 96.06⁄⁄
(5.30)
96.37⁄⁄
(5.30)
151.96⁄⁄
(3.11)
Fleet 1895⁄⁄
(36.42)
1898.70⁄⁄
(36.13)
2002.54⁄⁄
(34.76)
1412.40⁄
(45.52)
Commodity price 188.02⁄⁄
(12.87)
187.94⁄⁄
(12.93)
Trade 1715.70⁄⁄
(137.37)
1712.50⁄⁄
(137.82)
1074.19⁄⁄
(123.93)
2347.80⁄⁄
(219.75)
Forward start 61.86⁄⁄
(6.43)
61.83⁄⁄
(6.39)
62.47⁄⁄
(6.99)
42.58⁄⁄
(7.90)
R2 78.38% 78.33% 76.37% 42.91%
AIC 43,674 43,675 43,849 45,641
P. Agnolucci et al. / Transportation Research Part A 66 (2014) 173–184 179the need of paying the charter rate; length of the charter and number of days between the signing of the contract and the
start of the charter (Forward Start), and in the case of relative models the 1 year time charter rate for Panamax ships (Time
Charter Benchmark Rate). Estimated models have been judged on the basis of their ﬁt, on whether the sign of the coefﬁcients
conform to theory, and on the basis of the comparison between the effect of energy efﬁciency imputed by the model and the
maximum rational effect. Both models with variables in logarithms and levels have been estimated although only models
with variables in levels are discussed as taking the logarithms of the variables did not reduce the heteroscedasticity of
the residuals while making the interpretation of the results less intuitive. The imputed effect of fuel efﬁciency is computed
by using the estimated coefﬁcient on the variable of interest and the difference between the value of the variable represent-
ing energy efﬁciency for a speciﬁc ship and the average value in the ﬂeet. The maximum rational effect is computed by mul-
tiplying the fuel price observed at the contract date by the difference between a ship’s fuel consumption and the average in
the ﬂeet. Overall, one would expect imputed effect to be smaller than the maximum rational effect and the two effects to
have the same sign for most of the ﬁxtures observed in our dataset.4.1. Absolute models including the energy efﬁciency design index
Table 1 shows the coefﬁcients of the estimated models. Model 1 comprises a number of variables referring to technolog-
ical characteristics of the ships. Unfortunately, we discard this model as:
 it includes Gross Tonnage rather than the more meaningful Dead Weight Tonnage, and the sign on the former variable is
contrary to expectations. As higher values of Gross Tonnage enable a bigger cargo, one would expect a positive effect of
this variable on the charter rates;
 ship-based variables in the model, with the exclusion of Age, act as a single block as a consequence of the correlation
across them and estimated coefﬁcients.1 As soon as one ship-based variable is dropped, the signiﬁcance of the whole block
of variables falls apart, and the coefﬁcient on the intercept decreases to compensate for the change. Dropping these non-sta-
tistically signiﬁcant technological variables with the exception of EEDI leads to this variable becoming non-statistically sig-
niﬁcant, and the value of the coefﬁcient being just 2% of the value in Model 1;
 the model delivers implausible results in terms of imputed effect of energy efﬁciency. Average between imputed and
maximum rational effects is 1.5 rather than being positive and smaller than one, as one would expect, while the per-
centage of ﬁxtures for which the sign of the imputed and the maximum rational effects agree is a very low 53%.1 The value of the correlation between EEDI and Horsepower is very high, 0.86, while the correlation between EEDI and GT and between EEDI and Speed is
very similar, 0.15 and 0.13, respectively. Similarly, correlation between GT and Horsepower and between GT and Speed is 0.26 and 0.24, respectively. By
multiplying the values of the technological variables across ships by the coefﬁcients in Model 1, one obtains a very uniform value across ships. The cumulative
density of the computed value is very concentrated with 70% of the observations falling between 76,200 and 73,400.
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between the coefﬁcients in Model 1 and Model 2 can be observed, with the exception of the intercept.
In Model 2 and Model 3, the latter obtained after dropping commodity price, an increase in the age of the ship decreases
the time charter, each additional year decreasing the rate by about 350 dollars per day. The amount of fuel which can be
loaded onto a ship is a negative attribute, probably because it reduces the cargo carrying capacity, with each additional tonne
decreasing the time charter by about 2.5 dollars per day. Large ﬂeet size causes a decrease in the time charter rates because
of increased supply of shipping services, with each additional Million DWT causing a decrease of 2000 dollars per day. Trade
has a positive effect on time charter rates, as a consequence of increased demand for shipping services, with each additional
Million Tonne causing an increase ranging between 1700 and 1000 dollars per day. With regard to the start of charter period,
charters seem to have a preference for early starts, each day between the signing of the contract and the start of the laycan
period causing a decrease of 60 dollars in the charter rate.
Model 2 in the table includes the price of the commodity carried by Panamax ships. Commodity prices are incorporated in
Tsolakis (2005) and UNCTAD (2010), although these articles disagree on the sign of the coefﬁcient. The rationale for including
commodity price is that the rate is correlated with the value of the cargo, according to UNCTAD (2010), while commodity
price is said to act as a proxy for transportation demand according to Tsolakis (2005). With regard to fuel prices, it is not
entirely straightforward why time charter rates are positively inﬂuenced by this variable, as it occurs in Table 1, with a pos-
sible explanation, as suggested by a referee, related to the fact that high prices would encourage slow steaming and therefore
a larger demand for tonnage caused by increased journey time. Both coefﬁcients on the commodity and fuel price take some-
what high values. In Model 2, an increase in the fuel price of 10 dollars per tonne increases the time charter rates by about
1000 dollars per day even though the average increases in fuel expenditure for Panamax ship would be only about 350 dol-
lars. In the same model an increase in the commodity price of the same amount would result in an increase in the rate of
about 2000 dollars per day. Dropping the commodity price from Model 2 causes a substantial increase in the coefﬁcient
on the fuel price in Model 3, which is expected considering the correlation between the two variables – see Fig. 2.
In order to cast some light on these two issues Model 2 has been estimated on rolling and on recursive samples. After
ordering the dataset according to the contract date, the ﬁrst method implies estimating Model 2 on the ﬁrst 1000 observa-
tions, shifting the sample by 200 observations, i.e. adding the next 200 observations while dropping the ﬁrst 200, andFig. 3. Value of coefﬁcients and 95% conﬁdence bounds for Fuel Price, Fleet, Commodity Price and Trade from Model 3 in Table 1estimated on rolling
samples containing observations between the dates on the ticks in the horizontal axes.
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cedure above as no observations are discarded when new ones are added. If the relationship between fuel price and com-
modity price on one side, and time charters on the other is spurious we would expect the value of the coefﬁcient to
show considerable instability across samples. As one can see in Fig. 3, estimated coefﬁcient on fuel price is fairly stable across
rolling samples with the exception of the spike observed when using only observations between September 2007 and
January 2010. The same can be said in the case of trade coefﬁcient, although the spike is observed in the ﬁrst sample. In
the case of the ﬂeet variable one has the impression that two very different market conditions are incorporated in the data-
set, the values of the coefﬁcient in the ﬁrst three samples being almost three times the values in the remaining samples in
Fig. 3, a fact which may be explained by the rigidity of supply function described in Koopmans (1939). Finally, the value of
the coefﬁcient of commodity price is rather unstable, conﬁrming the divergence reported by Tsolakis (2005) and UNCTAD
(2010). As one can see in Fig. 3, estimated coefﬁcient is about 300 or 50 units either side away from zero. Recursive estima-
tion, not shown in the ﬁgure, delivers much more stable values in the coefﬁcients across samples due to the increasing
number of observations which smooth out the impact of additional data points.
Bearing in mind the instability in Fig. 3, one may be reluctant to include commodity price in the equation determining the
value of time charter rates. The argument on the correlation between value of the cargo and charter rates, as discussed in
UNCTAD (2010), may hold across commodities but it does not seem very stable across time, at least in the case of the dataset
discussed in this study. The estimation of the coefﬁcient on fuel price is relatively stable across rolling and recursive sample
therefore making spurious relationship unlikely. A positive coefﬁcient on fuel price could be explained by this variable acting
as a proxy for the economic activity and inﬂationary expectations in the economy. In term of model ﬁt one can notice that
dropping the commodity price does not have a considerable effect on the value of the adjusted R2 and Akaike Information
Criterion – compare Model 2 and Model 3 – while dropping fuel price decreases the values of the adjusted R2 by about 30
percentage points – compare Model 3 and Model 4. It would seem desirable to assess whether the fuel price has a legitimate
role in the equation of the time charter rates or whether the results in Table 1 are an artefact of the time span used in this
study. This is clearly an undertaking requiring a dataset spanning a much longer timespan than that used in this study.
4.2. Absolute models not including the energy efﬁciency design index
Based on feedback from industry practitioners and the results discussed above, we dropped Gross Tonnage and EEDI,
respectively, from the general model from where the search speciﬁcation is started. After doing so, we still faced the issue
of whether commodity and fuel price should be included in the model delivered by the search speciﬁcation, as discussed
above. In the models including fuel and commodity price or fuel price only, the estimated coefﬁcient on consumption is
about 150 implying an average of the ratio between imputed savings and maximum rational savings of 38%. We decided
to discard these models, as the coefﬁcient on consumption is not statistically signiﬁcant across rolling samples. In the case of
the model incorporating neither the fuel nor the commodity price, the coefﬁcient on fuel consumption is about three times
the values discussed above. Average of the ratio between maximum rational savings and imputed savings is very close to
unity, implying full transfer of fuel savings realised by more efﬁcient ships to ship owners. Unfortunately, in about a third
of the ﬁxtures, imputed savings are higher than maximum rational savings. In addition, adjusted R2 decreases by about 30
percentage points when fuel price is not used in the estimation. These two reasons lead to these models being discarded.
4.3. Relative models
The remainder of this section discusses models estimated based on a relative rather than an absolute approach. In the
former, that has been adopted so far, independent variables, including a proxy for energy efﬁciency, explain time charter
rates in the ﬁxtures. In the relative approach, one introduces among the independent variables a benchmark, which captures
common factors affecting all ﬁxtures, e.g. conditions of the industry and the economy, while the remaining independent
variables explain the difference between this benchmark and the rate in each ﬁxture. If variables related to the condition
in the economy and the industry still have an effect on a certain ﬁxture, one would expect a smaller coefﬁcient compared
to those in Table 1, as part of their effect is being captured through the introduction of the benchmark.
We have estimated models incorporating variables based on fuel consumption and fuel expenditure, the latter measured
by the difference between fuel expenditure of a ship and the average in the ﬂeet, or the average in the ships with similar
design speed. As similar results have been obtained regardless of the variable used in the model, only models using fuel
expenditure are presented, on the grounds that one can read directly the percentage of monetary savings passed on to ship
owners from the coefﬁcient in the model. As it is not a priori clear whether variables describing the conditions of the ship-
ping industry and the economy should have an inﬂuence on the differential between a ﬁxture rate and the benchmark, we
decided to incorporate all the variables discussed so far in the general model from which search speciﬁcation was started.
The second column of Table 2 shows the model obtained by dropping all non-statistically signiﬁcant variables. Surprisingly,
fuel and commodity price are preferred to ﬂeet size and trade, i.e. the variables traditionally used to represent the conditions
of demand and supply in the shipping industry. Estimated coefﬁcients on fuel and commodity price are much smaller than
those in Table 1, conﬁrming our expectations above. As we do not have strong prior views on whether variables describing
the condition of the economy and the shipping market should be inﬂuencing the charter rates in a relative approach, we have
estimated a model with ship-speciﬁc variables only (Model 2) and a model incorporating ﬂeet and trade as proxy for supply
Table 2
Estimated values, standard error in parentheses, and statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients from models based on the relative approach. Key for statistically
signiﬁcance: ⁄⁄=1%, ⁄=5%.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 3897.80⁄⁄
(4677.10)
1697.40⁄⁄
(4565.10)
1436.00⁄⁄
(4707.00)
Age 265.44⁄⁄
(42.94)
337.65⁄⁄
(42.93)
280.17⁄⁄
(45.75)
Dead weight tonnage 0.20⁄⁄
(0.06)
0.09
(0.06)
0.17⁄⁄
(0.06)
Bunker capacity 1.07⁄⁄
(0.29)
1.24⁄⁄
(0.31)
1.16⁄⁄
(0.30)
Time charter benchmark rate 1.05⁄⁄
(0.01)
0.99⁄⁄
(0.01)
0.96⁄⁄
(0.01)
Fuel price 11.72⁄⁄
(1.58)
Commodity price 92.90⁄⁄
(7.48)
Fleet 136.85⁄⁄
(14.55)
Trade 383.65⁄⁄
(66.27)
Forward start 83.91⁄⁄
(8.09)
81.25⁄⁄
(7.05)
82.08⁄⁄
(7.21)
Difference from average fuel expenditure 0.43⁄⁄
(0.11)
0.39⁄⁄
(0.12)
0.40⁄⁄
(0.12)
R2 95.34% 94.82% 94.97%
AIC 40,552 40,766 40,707
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els according to the adjusted R2. In addition, the value of the coefﬁcient on the difference from average fuel expenditure is
about 0.40 across all models in Table 2, implying that about 40% of the ﬁnancial savings arising from reduced fuel consump-
tions are recouped by the owners through increased charter rates. It is worth stressing, as discussed above, that a similar
ﬁgure was found in the speciﬁcations obtained when following the absolute approach discussed in Section 4.2. While those
models were discarded because the coefﬁcients were not robust across samples, all models in Table 2 display statistically
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients across recursive and rolling samples.
It is interesting to discuss how the value of the coefﬁcients on the difference between a ship’s fuel expenditure and the
average in the ﬂeet changes across time in presence of the very different market conditions. As shown in Fig. 4, one can see
an overall decreasing pattern in the absolute value of the size of fuel savings captured by shipowners, starting at about 50%
and almost halving when using samples geared toward the ending period of our data. The value in this graph have been used
by implementing the recursive and rolling sample procedure discussed above. This decreasing pattern in the fuel savings
captured by shipowners can be justiﬁed by a number of factors:
 when market was tight fuel efﬁcient ships were rewarded through price premium, while in a market with considerable
spare capacity they might be increasingly rewarded through higher utilisation rates;Fig. 4. Value of coefﬁcient, and upper and lower 95% conﬁdence interval bounds for the difference between a ship’s fuel expenditure and the average in the
ﬂeet estimated on recursive samples containing observations from January 2007 up to the month on the ticks (left ﬁgure) and on rolling samples containing
observations between the dates on the ticks (right ﬁgure).
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fuel efﬁcient ships to choose among, as pointed out by a referee;
 slow-steaming has becomemore common in an environment characterised by high fuel prices and low charter rates. As is
widely known, the difference in fuel consumption between a fuel efﬁcient ship and one with a standard design is much
smaller when slow steaming than at design speed. For this reason one would expect a decreasing trend in the size of the
fuel savings evaluated at design speed, i.e. the variables in our study, incorporated in the time charter market. As savings
computed at design speed overestimate the effective values captured when slow steaming, the coefﬁcient in the model
needs to decrease even though the percentage of savings captured by the shipowners stats constant.
It is ﬁnally worth mentioning that our ﬁndings in relation to the size of fuel savings across time are rather disappointing
for ship owners of fuel efﬁcient ships, bearing in mind the caveat mentioned above. In fact, before the time charter crash they
beneﬁted from higher rates and higher percentage of fuel savings incorporated in the charter price. Unfortunately, both
income streams decreased after the market crash.5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper presents the ﬁrst estimation in the literature of the extent to which energy efﬁcient ships are rewarded in the
market place for the fuel savings they deliver. Conﬁrming evidence form the press industry, we discovered that only part of
the ﬁnancial savings from energy efﬁciency accrues to ship owners. More speciﬁcally, we found that on average only 40% of
the ﬁnancial savings based on design efﬁciency accrue to the vessels’ owners, i.e. the party deciding the efﬁciency level of the
ships, with the estimated percentage showing a decreasing trend going from 50% when using the oldest using only the ﬁrst
1000 ﬁxtures in our sample to 25% when using the most recent 1000 ﬁxtures. From an environmental perspective, this is
discouraging because ship owners will not invest in energy efﬁciency as much as they would if they could retain the whole
amount of savings. As this is likely to be due to the lack of information and difﬁculty in verifying fuel consumption claims
made by ship owners, we believe that any policy facilitating the ﬂow of information on energy efﬁciency between charterers
and owners, would incentivise the level of investment in energy efﬁciency in the shipping sector and consequently reduce
emissions from the sector.
CO2 emissions from the shipping sector have considerably increased over the last decade, and with the rising inﬂuence of
Asian countries and their exports, they are likely to continue to do so. Considering the limited decarbonisation options avail-
able, increasing energy efﬁciency is a valuable contribution to reducing emissions in the shipping sector. Our ﬁndings are
important against the background of the current climate policy in the shipping sector and the policies encouraging the
uptake of energy efﬁciency. If energy efﬁciency is not adequately rewarded, then it can be introduced only by mandatory
standards (command and control instruments) which have to be abided by. On the other hand, if more energy efﬁcient ships
can charge a premium on the market, owners will have an incentive to invest in reducing fuel consumption. In the latter case,
the market will help achieving carbon reduction by rewarding environmentally-sound behaviour.
The fact that savings delivered by energy efﬁciency do not accrue entirely to the ship owners can have two explanations.
The ﬁrst is related to the fact that economic beneﬁts of each transaction are shared between the seller and buyer depending
on bargaining power. Any savings due to energy efﬁciency will be naturally divided between ship owners and charters
according to how strong demand for ships is compared to available supply. In fact, our rolling estimation conﬁrms that
our estimate of the percentage of the savings accruing to the owner decreases as observations from the peak of the market
are dropped from the estimation sample, as can be seen in Fig. 4. In a tight market ship owners have increased bargaining
power and therefore those with more energy efﬁcient ships are more likely to be fully rewarded for the saving enjoyed by
charters. From a policy point of view, there is not much one can do about this, as it seems inadequate to advocate a tight
shipping market for the beneﬁt of the uptake of energy efﬁciency.
The second explanation of our ﬁndings is related to the enforcement of contractual clauses. As fuel consumption clauses
included in the time charter contract may be difﬁcult to verify, charterers may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to enforce the fuel consump-
tion guarantee on the contract due to the related legal expenditure. In these settings, it would seem perfectly reasonable for
time charterers to be reluctant to pay the full premium for energy efﬁcient ships. To the extent to which our results are
caused by this factor, policy has a considerable role to play. Any instrument facilitating the diffusion of information or reduc-
ing the costs of holding ship owners accountable to their energy efﬁciency claims will help increase the maximum amount
that time charterers are willing to pay for the increased energy efﬁciency and stimulate the uptake of energy efﬁcient invest-
ments. Any type of policy facilitating the communication between charters and owners such as the EEDI is helpful to increase
the revenues accruing to owners of energy efﬁcient vessels. Other helpful policy measures may be related to the provision of
operational data which can be used by charters to verify fuel consumption such as weather data. As the operational energy
efﬁciency of a ship is also inﬂuenced by conditions of the ship, such as the deterioration of the hull and engine, any labelling
scheme signalling to potential charters the operational performance of a ship will be helpful in facilitating the uptake of
energy efﬁciency investments. Similarly, setting up a registry or database detailing consumption of the ship in previous char-
ters can help potential charters quantify the ﬁnancial savings which can be expected.
Throughout the discussion in this paper it is easy to identify several areas where further work would be beneﬁcial. It is
possible that dubious relationships within the variables in the model are caused by variables not considered in the model, for
184 P. Agnolucci et al. / Transportation Research Part A 66 (2014) 173–184example it is possible that the positive relation between fuel price and charter rate can be explained by more slow-steaming
and thus a larger demand for tonnage. Capturing this relationship would require additional data sources and one potential
data source is the satellite automatic identiﬁcation system (S-AIS) with which it is possible to determine the operating speed
of ships. Secondly, we discussed that the key ﬁnding of this paper, i.e. the percentage of savings recovered by shipowners is
directly related to market supply and demand and the extent to which this is captured in the modelling. Possible improve-
ments and reﬁnements can come from and extended data set covering a longer period of time, to even out the supply
demand imbalances witnessed in the period used in this paper. Unfortunately the Clarkson’s data set does not go beyond
that which has been used in this paper and alternative sources such as IHS Fairplay (Sea-web) are also for a shorter period.
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